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Gection 1: Introduction 
The 1970s saw a resurgence of the notion that transferring 
assets from the public sector to private enterprise would 
raise both allocative and technical efficiency, leading to 
greater economic well-being. The intellectual argument in 
support of this idea linked performance to ownership: 
II . . ..privatization involves more than the simple transfer of 
ownership. It involves the transfer and redefinition of a 
complex bundle of property rights which creates a whole new 
penalty-reward system which will alter the incentives in the 
firm and ultimately its performance" (Veljanovsky, 1987, 
pp.77-78). 
This resurgence in turn led in the UK and elsewhere to 
privatisation and the transferring of remaining state 
activities from departments to separate governmental agencies. 
In the UK over E4Obn. of state assets have been sold since 
1979 and currently huge chunks of the civil service are being 
hived-off to agencies with the objective of ttcommercial 
management" (HMSO, 1988). However, the point was made in the 
mid-1980s that the case for such policies was strong on a 
priori theorising but relatively weak in empirical 
confirmation (Parker, 1985). Studies in various countries of 
the comparative efficiency of public and private enterprises 
have produced mixed results, but certainly no overwhelming 
support for the notion that private enterprise is always 
superior to public enterprise. In monopolistic industries such 
as gas, water and electricity, there is even some suggestion 
2. 
of lower cost production under public ownership. This may 
result from inefficiencies introduced in private firms where 
there is a need for continued state regulation of prices or 
profits (Millward and Parker, 1983; Parker, 1989). Bishop and 
Kay (1989) in a survey of early post-privatisation data for 
the UK have suggested that there is no real evidence of major 
efficiency gains. Lynk (1991) points to the paucity of 
econometric analysis of production and cost functions 
prevailing in privatised industries. 
There is clearly a need for more studies of the effect of 
changes in organisational status, including moving functions 
into government agencies and transferring them across the 
public-private divide (privatisation and nationalisation). 
This paper summarises some of the results of a major research 
programme based at the University of York, which has been 
concerned with the validity of public choice and related 
theories '. A number of organisations which underwent relevant 
status changes in the post-war period were studied. The 
research was divided into two, albeit related, parts. The 
first part tested for performance changes at around the time 
of the status change. Was there any evidence of improved or 
deteriorating performance ? The second part was concerned with 
the attempting to identify the cause of performance changes 
observed or not observed. It explored where in the 
organisation performance changes originated. What went on 
within the organisations which led to changed performance? 
What were the mechanisms of change ? This part of the research 
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is currently being completed and only general observations are 
reported in this paper. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the 
hypothesis on organisational status change and performance is 
formally set out. The performance measures used are explained 
and the main results are reported in summary form with 
comment. Part 3 of the paper discusses the nature of the -(. 
incompleted research into internal mechanisms. Section 4 
provides some general conclusions and outlines the policy 
implications. 
Section 2: Testinu for Performance Chancres 
The analytical framework used for assessing the effect of 
organisational status on performance has been presented 
elsewhere (Dunsire et.al., 1988), hence it is outlined here 
only briefly. It is summarised in Figure 1. On the west-to- 
east axis are positioned certain organisational forms intended 
to represent the main types of ownership in the public and 
private sectors, namely government departments, governmental 
agencies (eg.trading funds), public corporations, hybrids (eg. 
private sector firms highly dependent on government contracts, 
or cooperatives, charities etc.), private sector PLCs and 
owner managed firms. 
Drawing on the conclusions of property rights and public 
choice theorists (Parker, 1985, Mitchell, 1988), the central 
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hypothesis is that as organisations in the public sector move 
away from political control and Exchequer financing towards 
more independent management their economic and financial 
performance improve. This should show up particularly when an 
organisation is privatised, but should also be evident when 
organisations remain in the public sector and achieve an 
llarm's length" relationship from government. Quasi- 
governmental agencies and public corporations were created 
precisely to reduce political intervention and to introduce 
more commercially orientated management. Also, the schema 
suggests that organisational changes can be expected to have 
their most profound effect on performance the further east 
organisations travel.2 
(Figure 1 here.) 
According to standard economic theory, performance is also 
affected by the degree of competition in the product market. 
While high efficiency is necessary for survival in competitive 
markets, monopoly provides opportunity for managers and 
workers to pursue on-the-job leisure and discretionary 
expenditures leading to organisational "slack". In Figure 1 
changes in the level of competition are represented by 
movements on the north-to-south axis. Efficiency is expected 
to rise if firms move southwards but decline with northward 
moves. 
Combining the effects of the product market (north-to-south 
axis) and the capital market (west-to-east axis) leads to the 
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conclusion that there should be large efficiency gains if 
organisations move south-eastward and large efficiency 
reductions if they move north-westwards. The effect of a 
movement between south-west and north-east is less easy to 
isolate because the product market and capital market 
constraints conflict. 
Ten organisations were selected for study on the basis that 
they had undergone relevant status changes. The sample 
includes all the movements within the public sector and 
between the public and private sectors set out in Figure 1. 
The organisations studied were the postal and 
telecommunications services; Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
(HMSO); Rolls Royce (aero and marine engines); British 
Aerospace; the National Freight Corporation (NFC); London 
Transport; the Royal Mint; the Royal Ordnance Factories; and 
British Airways. Because the research began in 1986187, 
privatisations from the mid-1980s were not studied. However, 
British Airways was included to test for 'Ianticipation 
effects". Although it was not privatised until 1987, a formal 
timetable for privatisation was agreed in 1980. The 
organisations, the status changes studied, the dates of the 
status changes, and the direction of the expected change in 
efficiency are summarised in Table 1. Only three of the 
organisations studied had identifiable changes in product 
market competition which might also have impacted on 
performance in the periods studied - British Aerospace 1977 
(the nationalisation of three airframe manufacturers to form 
British Aerospace reduced competition), London Transport 1984 
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(tendering for a quarter of London's bus services was 
introduced) and the HMSO 1982 (loss of the monopoly as 
supplier of stationery to government departments). In all 
other cases, efficiency changes can be more readily related to 
the change in organisational status. 
(Table 1 here.) 
Figure 2 shows the movements of each of the ten organisations 
at around the time of the status change using the schema of 
Figure 1. Since Rolls Royce and British Aerospace were 
dependent to a significant degree on government contracts and 
ttlaunch aid", the dotted line between the hybrid and PLC 
categories is intended to reflect the ambiguity about their 
precise status change. Two of the organisations - London 
Transport and British Aerospace - went through two status 
changes during the period considered. Hence, in total, 12 
status changes were studied. 
(Figure 2 here.) 
The study was concerned only with identifying changes in 
production efficiency, wider social welfare effects were 
ignored, including the implications for efficiency in 
competing firms (for an insight into this problem see De 
Fraja, 1991). Moreover, because none of the organisations 
provided data to assess the quality of services before and 
after the status change, it was not possible to test whether 
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economic and financial performance improvements occurred at 
the expense of service quality. 
Three broad measures were used to identify changes in 
production efficiency - an employment function, productivity 
measures, and a set of financial ratios. 
(a) Employment function 
An attempt was made to capture the longer-term effects of a 
change in organisational status by including a binary (dummy) 
variable in a standard employment function. Various employment 
functions were tested (Parker and Hartley, 1991) but the one 
that provided the most satisfactory fit was based on the 
function suggested by Ball and StCyr (1966) and took the 
general form: 
Lt = C + biVi + CiXVi + DV + mt 
where L is employment; C is a constant; V is a vector of 
variables, notably output, a time trend and a lagged dependent 
variable; X is a slope shift dummy variable for the status 
change applied to V; and DV is an intercept shift dummy. A 
negative relationship was predicted for the intercept shift 
dummy where a west-to-east organisational status change 
occurred. The dummy variable was used in its slope shift form 
to estimate any favourable performance effects of status 
change on output, productivity trends, and on the speed with 
which employment adjusted to output. 
(b) Productivity 
Both labour and total factor productivity were estimated for 
the four years before the status change and were compared with 
the figures for the four years after. Four year periods were 
selected to capture Itleads and lags" in performance changes 
associated' with the status change. The effect of changes in 
macroeconomic factors on productivity was removed by comparing 
the figures with changes in productivity in the UK economy, UK 
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manufacturing and the public corporation sector. 
In the absence of information about hours worked, labour 
productivity was assessed by calculating the change in each 
organisation's volume of output in relation to changes in the 
labour input. Total factor productivity was estimated on the 
basis of the rate of growth of output minus a weighted average 
of input growth rates, where the weights are the share of each 
input in total cost (for a more detailed explanation of the 
procedure and its underlying assumptions see Millward and 
Parker, 1983, pp.225-229 or Parker, 1990; and for its precise 
application in this research, Hartley, Parker and Martin, 
1991). 
(c) Financial ratios 
This part of the study was concerned with changes in the 
trends of financial ratios associated with an organisational 
change.3 The specific financial ratios studied were intended 
to reflect the quality of management in terms of the efficient 
use of working capital; labour, fixed assets and 
profitability. The data came from each organisation's annual 
reports and accounts, supplemented where necessary with 
information from internal accounts and papers. 
Six ratios were used: 
(1) Profitability: percentage return on capital employed 
(ROCE). 
(2) Turnover to average net fixed assets employed. -"_ 
(3) Stocks (including work in progress) to turnover. 
(4) Debtors to turnover. 
(5) Labour's share in expenditure. 
(6) Value added per employee.4 
It might be argued that profitability should be taken as the 
key measure of financial performance and that the other ratios 
are subsidiary. However, all of the organisations spent some 
time in the public sector where other goals may have been more 
important than profitability. Performance measured simply in 
terms of the rate of return on capital could, therefore, 
reflect changes in objectives. Nonetheless, in five of the ten 
cases profitability improved (although for Rolls Royce, 
contrary to expectation) and in no cases did it decline 
following the status change. 
The ratios were studied by taking four year averages for 
before and after the status change and were tested using a 
simple covariance model of the following form: 
vit = a + bti + DV + mit 
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where Vit is a vector of performance measures; t is time: DV 
is a binary variable for the status change applied in slope 
and intercept shift forms; and mit is a normally distributed 
error term. Other factors affecting performance over time are 
captured in the time trend, t (see Kmenta, 1971, pp.409-430). 
The full statistical results using each of the three measures 
are given in Parker and Hartley, 1991a and 1991b, and Hartley, 
Parker and Martin, 1991. Table 2 therefore provides only a 
brief summary of the results.5 
(Table 2 here.) 
On the basis of the sample, west-to-east movements (Figure 1) 
appear to have led to improved performance in 5 of the 12 
status changes studied, ie. the Royal Mint, London Transport 
(19841, British Aerospace (1981) t British Airways and the 
National Freight Corporation. This includes all three of the 
organisations which were privatised. In a further six cases 
the performance measures produced conflicting results and 
hence status change had uncertain effects, ie. London 
Transport (1970), the postal and telecommunications services, 
the ROF, the nationalisation of British Aerospace and the 
HMSO. In one of these cases, however, London Transport, there 
was clear evidence of a major loss of efficiency in the late 
1970s and early 198Os, which might imply a delayed effect 
consistent with the central hypothesis. Only one case appeared 
completely contrary to expectation - the performance of Rolls 
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Royce improved after nationalisation. However, this result 
might well be explained by the "shock effect" of bankruptcy in 
1971, which led to the government takeover. In support of this 
view, study of performance in later years show a marked 
deterioration in all three performance measures from the mid- 
1970s. In other words, by the mid-1970s nationalisation was 
having the effect on performance that the central hypothesis 
predicts. 
It appears, therefore, that west-to-east status changes can be 
expected to lead to improved performance, though this 
performance improvement is not guaranteed. Also, one of the 
cases which clearly supported the central hypothesis was also 
associated with a change in competition - London 
Transport(1984) - and the possibility that the change in the 
product market had an effect on this result cannot be ignored. 
The fact that all of the privatisation cases were associated 
with improved performance supports the view that performance 
improvements are most likely the further eastwards the change 
in status. 
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Section 3: Exploring the Internal Environment 
The statement that "ownership" effects performance says 
nothing about how the effect is achieved. In what ways do 
organisations change when their ownership status alters and 
what causes/prevents changes in performance? "The underlying 
model assumes some stimulus/response mechanism, some form of 
ecological adaptation" (Woodward, 1988), but what is it? To 
shed light on this requires looking inside organisations, in 
other words, prising open the economist's "black box". An 
attempt can then be made to observe how the organisation 
adapts to a new external environment. An external environment 
in which changes in the capital market (and product market 
where relevant) introduces new threats, while politically 
imposed constraints (eg. limits on pricing and investment) are 
removed. 
In the subject area of privatisation it appears that the least 
research has been undertaken in this area, which makes it 
potentially most fertile. If the sources of efficiency gains 
or the reasons why efficiency did not improve can be 
identified, this has obvious value to policy makers, 
government departments selected for agency status and the 
managements of firms yet to privatise (in the UK, especially 
London Transport and the coal and rail industries). 
An attempt has -been made to relate the above findings on 
organisational status changes and performance to a set of 
variables, detailed below and collectively referred to as the 
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"internal environment". The working hypothesis is that where 
performance improvement was not found, or where there was 
ambiguity about the effect on performance, there will be fewer 
changes in the internal environment than where efficiency 
clearly increased. 
There are special difficulties in undertaking this type of 
research. What the research is trying to identify in its most 
general sense is a change in the organisation's *'cultureI' (the 
organisation's meanings, beliefs and values) which impacts on 
performance. But this requires identifying a number of factors 
which might reflect or provide some evidence of a cultural 
change, while bearing in mind the analytical distinction 
between structures, policies, processes and strategies and the 
"cultural system" (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984). Also, it is 
important to recognise that changes in the internal 
environment may result from other factors. For example, in the 
1980s the "Thatcher factor" is known to have led to a greater 
commercialisation of the public services independent of 
changes in their formal status.6 
According to Peters (1980) performance is associated with 
management clearly signalling the right priorities and 
providing consistent guidance. Figure 3 provides a simple 
schema linking management, goals, human resources and 
organisational structure to a firm's performance. The quality 
and behaviour of management influences performance and is 
linked to the goals of the firm (dotted line). The management 
determines the goals the firm pursues (subject to the capital 
1.4 
market and product market constraints detailed earlier) and 
these goals then impinge on performance. At its simplest, a 
non-profit making goal can be expected to lead to low 
profitability ! Research suggests that the "organisational fit" 
between the organisation and its external environment can have 
an important effect on a firm's performance, while structure 
is itself linked to management through reporting systems or 
the effectiveness of the management's "span of control". In J. 
addition, the organisational structure is linked to the firm's 
resources both capital and labour, which in turn impact on 
performance. For example, the organisational structure may be 
reflected in the type of human resource policy pursued and the 
quantity and quality (reliability, skills and education) of 
the firm's labour force. 
(Figure 3 here.) 
Therefore, the following variables appear to capture the 
important changes in the internal environment which might be 
expected where there is significant cultural change in an 
organisation: 
1. Organisational Structure 
According to the organisational theory literature (especially 
contingency theory), there is no single structure or mode of 
control which is optimal for all organisations (optimal here 
means the form which is best suited to maximising performance 
as measured earlier). The optimal form varies with 
circumstances and is likely, therefore, to change over time 
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(Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1977). However, 
the adoption of a mode of control incongruent with an 
enterprise's position, internal or external, will lead to 
reduced performance. Insofar as public ownership is associated 
with non-optimal structures, changes would be expected 
whenever movements along the west-east axis in Figure 1 occur. 
Also, changes in organisational form will be associated with 
changes in theA,product market (adaptation to the external 
environment), ie. with north-south movements. 
Figure 4 illustrates the expectation regarding the direction 
of change in mode of control associated with west-to-east 
shifts in organisational status. It relates an organisation's 
structure to whether it is predominantly command or results 
orientated. The state sector is popularly perceived as rule 
bound and bureaucratic, burdened with the "alienation, avarice 
and a lowered sense of autonomy" said to be associated with 
bureaucracy (Ouchi, 1981, p.84). Although this is no doubt an 
unfair caricature (at least for some parts of the state), a 
west-east organisational status change is likely to lead to a 
change in managerial goals away from "doing it right" 
(procedures) to results - from a primary concern with "inputs" 
to "outputs", including an emphasis upon the quantity and 
quality of the output. A movement away from Burns and 
Stalker's (1962) "mechanistic" mode of management. 
The schema builds on ideas from managerial economics and the 
strategic management literature (eg. Williamson, 1970, 1975; 
Johnson and Scholes, 1988). Point A is highly command 
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orientated. It is associated with a hierarchical organisation 
and top down orders, and is closest to the rule bound 
bureaucracy which is supposed to exist in government. B is 
characterised by a large HQ with centralised finance, 
marketing, personnel, planning, R&D, etc, functions. This 
represents a managerial form broadly corresponding to the 
"staff and line" pattern of classic scientific management, to 
Chandler's (1962) llcentralisedn and Williamson's (1970) 
"unified" form. By contrast, point C is associated with the 
idea of cost or profit centres. The HQ is relatively small and 
~8facilitatesl~ the operations of the divisions and monitors 
their performance individually. This broadly corresponds with 
Chandler's multidivisional or '@decentralisedI structure or 
Williamson's lVM-form@*. Point D is archetypal entrepreneurial 
firm, output orientated with a flattened managerial structure. 
Therefore, as an organisation moves away from an emphasis on 
"how things are done" towards "concern with the outcomesl@ the 
expectation is that this will be reflected in a change in 
organisational structure consistent, in terms of Figure 4, 
with a movement along the curve A-to-E. A change in structure 
from a hierarchical to a more devolved form of management (or 
in Williamson's terms from 88M-form@@ to YJ-form"'). 
(Figure 4 here.) 
A weaker hypothesis would directly address the uncertainty in 
the organisational theory literature regarding the optimal 
mode of control. Based on the notion that politically 
controlled bodies are likely to have non-optimal structures, 
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the expectation would be that there will be a change of mode 
of control in any direction as the organisation's status 
changes. In other words, organisational status changes will be 
associated with some kind of change in structure or mode of 
control. 
2. Goals 
Related to the change of mode of control will be a change in 
goals. Although profits are not sufficient for assessing 
performance, they do provide a concrete objective which may be 
missing in politically controlled activities. Here goals are 
more likely to be multifarious and less tangible, concerned 
more with achieving some vague notion of the "public 
interest". Hence, we might expect west-to-east movements to be 
associated with more concern with the bottom line. This also 
implies more stress on meeting the needs of the consumer. 
3. Mission and Strategy 
Insofar as the goals of the organisation becomes clearer with 
west-east movements, this should reflect itself in the 
organisation's strategy for converting the set of objectives 
into performance. As Drucker comments, strategy exploits 
opportunity, the right moment - or what Greek theologians call 
Kairos, the point where the new is received (Drucker, 1990, 
p.77). Changes in organisational status are points of Kairos, 
which, the expectation is, management will exploit. This 
should be reflected in clear changes of strategy and perhaps 
even of changes in @Nmission8@. 
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4. Management 
Changes in organisational status which lead to discernible 
performance improvements might be expected to be associated 
with changes in management. This might be in the form of new 
managers (entrepreneurs rather than bureaucrats, to use the 
populist descriptions), changed titles (in the civil service 
top managers are known as permanent secretaries, in private 
enterprise as chief executives) and new employment contracts 
(perhaps linking pay and tenure more closely to performance). 
Civil servants have jobs for life and the pay of public sector 
managers is rarely related to performance in any meaningful 
way. 
Also, many state enterprises began in government departments 
and departmental culture takes a long-time to change. 
Managerial behaviour may therefore have an engineering or 
technical bias and consumer orientation may be weak. A 
reflection of a change would be the sweeping away of 
lVcontrollers@@ and the establishment of a Marketing Department. 
As Ramanadham (1988, p.3) observes succinctly: ~~Analytically, 
if the essence of public enterprise is that it rests on some 
kind and degree of de-marketisation of enterprise operations, 
privatisation implies some kind and degree of re- 
marketisation." Serving "the public" converts to serving "the 
consumer". 
5. Labour 
A change in organisational status might also be reflected in 
human resource policy. There might be a reduction in the 
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labour force (switching from labour to capital and reducing 
over-manning) and a change in labour relations, labour 
employment contracts and staff training. 
The public sector has a tradition of '@collective bargaining". 
Post-war nationalisation legislation included a statutory 
commitment to "good labour relations practices" and the civil 
service recognises unions and has a well-developed tradition 
of employee consultation through the Whitley Councils. Insofar 
as the public sector is more sympathetic to unionisation, 
collective bargaining and employee participation, a Figure 1 
west-to-east shift is likely to be associated with some change 
in human resource policy to create a more VlflexiblelV 
(compliant, docile?) labour force. Certainly the unions have 
anticipated that privatisation will lead to major redundancies 
and worse pay and conditions. As the TUC has commented (TUC, 
1986): "there is every indication that it is one of the 
Government's deliberate objectives; privatisation is supposed 
to undermine workers' conditions. That is one of the ways to 
make companies more profitable for their new owners.l17 
6. Reporting Systems 
Management success in achieving its goals requires effective 
reporting systems. Hence, organisational status changes might 
be expected to be associated with the introduction of new 
reporting structures, including new accounting systems. What 
senior management want to know may change as may the way in 
which lower ranks of management are controlled. Also, a change 
in the capital market may require changes to the type of 
published accounts and annual reports.8 
7 Nature and Location of the Business 
Finally, public enterprises tend to be heavily restricted by 
political and administrative constraints (departmental 
boundaries or geographical areas in the case of local 
authorities), or, in the case of nationalised industries, by I. 
their founding statutes. By contrast, private enterprise is 
much freer to develop new lines of business (eg. new export 
markets or sourcing overseas), invest in new locations 
(including overseas), divest, diversify, and become involved 
in mergers and takeovers. As Drucker comments: 
"Non-profit organizations have no 'bottom line'. They are 
prone to consider everything they do to be righteous and 
moral and to serve a cause, so they are not willing to 
say, if it doesn't produce results then maybe we should 
I 
direct our resources elsewhere. Non-profit organizations 
need the discipline of organized abandonment perhaps even 
more than a business does. They need to face up to 
critical choices." (Drucker, 1990, p.8) 9 
A Figure 1 west-east shift might therefore be expected to lead 
to changes in the nature of the markets served or the sale of 
some lines of business and the acquisition of others. 
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The Results to Date 
To date a series of in-depth case studies of the history of 
eight of the ten organisations studied have been written based 
on interviews, published reports and internal data (Dunsire, 
1991). From these studies an attempt is underway to identify 
changes in the internal environment under the headings 
outlined above. Unfortunately, this work is incomplete and -I. 
hence the following is only a series of general (and 
tentative) observations on each of the organisations. These 
notes do, however, provide an indication of the general extent 
to which the organisations changed with their status change. 
1. Royal Mint 
The Royal Mint began with a functional structure of management 
and there was little discernible change throughout the period 
studied. Nor did accounting practices, remuneration or 
employment conditions appear to alter in a way that was likely 
to spark a performance change. The source of the performance 
improvement after the introduction of trading fund status, as 
discovered in the first part of the research programme, cannot 
be readily associated with any of the changes in the internal 
environment outlined above. Instead, a likely cause was 
technological improvements in the production process related 
to the movement of the Mint from crowded conditions in London 
to a new, purpose built plant in South Wales. This sheds doubt 
on whether the status change was necessary to the improved 
performance. If it was not, then the Royal Mint ceases to be 
supportive of the central hypothesis. 
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2. Royal Ordnance Factories 
The ROF were organised on a functional basis but with profit 
centres. However, in 1973, a year before trading fund status, 
the structure became more functional and Director Generals 
were appointed for production, procurement and administration 
and finance. In 1974 a marketing co-ordinator was brought in 
from outside. Hence, there were significant changes in some of 
the internal environment variables. But the ROF did not 
support the central hypothesis, performance declined after the 
introduction of trading fund status. How might this be 
explained? One possibility is that the organisation became 
over centralised. The mode of control moved more towards point 
B in Figure 4, which may not have been the optimal structure 
for an organisation wanting to become more commercial and 
profit orientated. Interestingly, in 1984, immediately before 
privatisation of the ROF, consultants recommended the 
establishment of four separate operating companies. 
3.Postal Service 
The'movement from government department to public corporation 
status in 1969 was preceded from the early 1960s by some 
reorganisation and a clearer separation of the postal and 
telecommunications businesses of the Post Office in 1967. 
However, the postal service management structure continued to 
be highly functional. Only in the 1980s were separate 
companies formed for each of the main areas of the postal 
business. In other words, only in the 1980s was there a 
sianificant chanae in mndn nf pnntrnl tnwarilc nvrrCi t Pantrcrc 
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This in turn led to long-overdue changes in working practices 
and a new, more commercially orientated management style. 
Thus, although its legal status altered in 1969, the Post 
Office retained its government department culture and 
structure for a further decade. The "Thatcher factor" proved 
more important in rejuvenating the organisation than the move 
to public corporation status. 
4. Telecommunications 
Post Office telecommunications had separate accounts from the 
postal (and later, Giro) businesses and its own staffing and 
management below board level. However, it never really got to 
grips with defining and managing its various activities. The 
Post Office's acquisition of public corporation status had no 
apparently significant effects on the internal environmental 
variables outlined above. Also, there is evidence of 
continuing frictions between lVmanagement@l and *Vtechnicalll 
staffs. In 1979, ten years after the introduction of the 
status change, the centre did not trust its field workers 
(Beesley and Laidlaw 1989, p.21). 
In 1981 telecommunications became a completely separate 
corporation from the Post Office and three years later the 
corporation was privatised. The act of privatisation, 
subsequent prodding by OFTEL, and the threat from more 
competition in the equipment market and in business and long- 
distance calls (provided by Mercury Communications), provoked 
a more aggressively commercial management style. There was a 
new interest in the l~consumer~~ and associated marketing of 
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services. However, one less desirable product of privatisation 
was BT's decision to stop publishing quality of service 
indicators (as required under the 1978 Nationalised Industries 
White Paper) on the grounds that such information was 
"commercially sensitive". Also, it has taken BT some time to 
tackle over-manning, especially at management levels. Only 
after 1989 were large scale redundancies announced, while at 
the time of writing the search continues for the optimal 
organisational structure. 
5. Rolls Royce 
The movement of Rolls Royce into the state sector was 
associated with major managerial failures, particularly 
relating to the RB211 project. The DTI inspectors' report 
details major weaknesses in the way the company was being run, 
particularly in the divisional and corporate accounting 
function (MacCrindle and Godfrey, 1973). Based on a 
multidivisional "profit centres" structure, the main board 
(overweighted with engineers and long-serving executive 
members) did not receive the information it needed to keep 
track of the financial drain coming from aero engines. 
Following bankruptcy and the state takeover, not surprisingly 
there were major redundancies and management changes with a 
completely new board appointed. In the mid-1970s performance 
began to deteriorate badly again and it may be significant 
that just before overall profitability was restored, the 
company restructured towards a more functional form with 
management of production and design centralised. This implies 
that the mode of control under nationalisation had remained 
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inadequate to maintain cost control in the various activities 
of Rolls Royce. 
6. British Aerospace 
Surprisingly, the nationalisation of three firms in the 
aerospace industry to form BAe led to relatively few 
organisational changes. Below the new corporation board, the 
old companies were retained as a multi-divisional structure. 
Nor did there appear to be significant changes in employment 
terms and conditions, although, in tune with the times, annual 
reports contained long and enthusiastic commitments to good 
labour relations. 
Privatisation in 1981 was followed in 1983 by the appointment 
of a new managing director and major internal change focused 
upon centralising the structure. A whole tier of management 
was abolished and marketing, research etc. functions were 
unified as management attempted to pull together and 
rationalise the activities of the founder companies. By 1986 
the board of BAe was highly functional in nature. Yet in 1987 
a new chairman oversaw a reverse process as activities were 
de-centralised and separate limited companies for divisions 
were established. Within a year BAe had adopted a tlholding 
company" r‘orm. 
Hence, the history of BAe can be broken into three broad 
periods. The first from 1977 to 1983 contained the short 
period of state control and was associated with a relatively 
loose affiliation of operations inherited from the 
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nationalised companies. From 1983 to 1987 the management of 
BAe centralised to take control (and stock?) of its disparate 
activities. After 1987 the decision was taken that the optimal 
structural form lay in separate operating companies. One 
impetus for this came from the need to assimilate new 
acquisitions, notably the ROF and Rover cars. But it may also 
have reflected the fashion in the management literature for 
"flattening" ,. the management pyramid and sweeping away tiers of 
middle management. 
7. London Transport 
The introduction of local government control over LT in 1970 
does not appear to have been associated with any significant 
changes in the internal environment. LT retained a highly 
centralised and functional board structure. Although bus and 
rail operations were gathered and given to separate board 
members in 1971, neither had control of planning, engineering 
supply/stores, personnel, industrial relations, or finance. 
Only in 1978, in the face of a deteriorating financial 
situation, did a major reorganisation take place. A new 
chairman and deputy were appointed from outside and 
established two businesses (profit centres), which absorbed 
most of the engineering and supply functions. Also, management 
was decentralised within them into smaller units, each with 
budgeting and personnel powers. Performance measures were 
introduced for management at all levels. This trend continued 
in 1984 when LT became directly accountable once more to 
central government. Subsidiary companies were formed to manage 
the bus and underground businesses and the strategy was 
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subsequently extended to most of LT's activities. By 1988 a 
small central HQ confined itself to corporate planning and 
financial oversight and was surrounded by subsidiary companies 
and lUbusiness boards". A number of profit centres, such as 
computing and architects, charged for their services in order 
to instil financial discipline. 
Broadly, the source of LT's performance improvement after 1984 
appears to lie in the reorganisation and new management style 
introduced from 1978. 
8. HMSO 
Throughout the 1970s there was an on-going llcommercialisationU1 
of the HMSO, which began well before the decision was taken to 
establish a trading fund. The creation of a trading fund can 
therefore by seen as a product of, rather than the cause of, 
the greater commercialisation. In accordance with expectation, 
the move to trading fund status was associated with a switch 
from a functional to a profit centre structure during the 
1970s. There were also changes in reporting systems with a new 
management accounting system introduced in 1972. However, 
there was no input of new senior management and the labour 
force remained civil servants, with the normal civil service 
terms and conditions. 
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Conclusions on the Internal Environment 
The results for this part of the research programme are 
incomplete. Yet, already it is apparent that when completed 
they are likely to be even less clear cut than the statistical 
results reported earlier. At this stage, it appears that: 
n Some organisations underwent changes in their internal 
environment as predicted, but some did not. 
n Changes in the internal environment in many cases 
occurred inaependently of, or at least well in advance of 
or after the status change, which makes the 
identification of causation difficult. This also implies 
that in testing for performance changes associated with 
status change, the ttleads and lagstt may have to be longer 
than the periods used in the first part of this paper. 
w Turning specifically to modes of control, no examples 
of pure hierarchy were found amongst the ten 
organisations studied (though several were perhaps nearer 
A than B in Figure 4 at the outset) and only one clear 
case of a Itholding company'@ was identified (BAe from 
1987). Most organisations could be placed around points B 
or C. But in any case it is not always easy to associate 
performance changes with changes in the internal 
environment. Four of the organisations underwent a clear 
control-mode shift (Figure 2) - HMSO and LT towards 
"profit centres" and BAe (privatisation) and ROF towards 
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a centralised, ttfunctional form - but only two of these, 
BAe and LT in the 198Os, showed a clear improvement in 
performance. In the other cases, performance seems to 
have improved independently of a change in control mode. 
Section 4: Overall Conclusions 
The research has been concerned with (1) testing the 
hypothesis that a change in organisational status leads to a 
change in performance and with (2) attempting to identify the 
relationship between performance and the organisation's 
internal environment. 
The results confirm that a Figure 1 west-to-east (political to 
private) shift is associated with improved performance, but 
that this performance improvement is not guaranteed. There was 
no definite relationship between enterprise performance and 
status change, change in competition, or change in control 
mode, singly or in combination. Thus the link between 
organisational status and performance is apparently much more 
complex than many commentators (notably politicians) have 
assumed. The results appear to be congruent with aspects of 
the organisation literature, especially contingency theory, 
which suggest that performance is the product of many and 
often subtle forces (Perry and Rainey, 1988). 
The findings suggest that further research is needed to 
address the factors that determine performance. What other 
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changes should be instituted at the time of the organisational 
change - perhaps more competition, new management or 
incentive-type employment contracts? if we are truly to 
understand the determinants of organisational performance, 
there is a need for more research into what happens within 
organisations when their status changes. 
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Notes 
1. The research was funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council as part of its Management in Government Initiative 
(Project no. E0925006). Other members of the research team 
included Professors Keith Hartley and Andrew Dunsire. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
2. Stephen Littlechild warns in relation to organisations 
which retain some government ownership, that: II.... as long as 
ultimate control lies with government, one cannot 
realistically hope 
(Littlechild, 1981, p.14;: 
avoid all the problems...." 
3. Owing to the major changes in the Royal Mint's financial 
records around the time of the status change, it was not 
possible to produce reliable financial ratios for this 
organisation. 
4. In the absence of detailed information on purchases, this 
was approximated as (P+I+W)/N where P = profit before tax, I = 
capital charges in the form of interest on long-term loans, 
and W = employee wages. P, I and W were expressed in real 
terms. 
5. ttUnclear@t in Table 2 means that the results of the test 
varied depending upon the precise dates, price deflators or 
national comparisons used. 
6. Research suggests that firms need periodic 'Icultural 
change" and that this occurs at discrete intervals rather than 
as smooth adaptations to changes in the external environment. 
Firms also appear to suffer adaptation "inertiatt, which events 
such as privatisation may overcome. However, it is important 
in this line of research to beware of a "Hawthorn effect" 
(Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939) - that any organisational 
change creates a shock effect which leads to a questioning of 
existing practices and beliefs, leading in turn to improved 
performance (at the same time, of course, major change risks 
disruption costs which could depress performance). Such an 
improvement is not likely to be long maintained in the absence 
of a further ttshocktt. An example of this may well be Rolls 
Royce, where bankruptcy in 1971 led to improved efficiency, 
but the improvement was not sustained into the second half of 
the decade. 
7. Many privatised organisations reduced their labour force as 
part of their economic restructuring ahead of privatisation, 
eg= BSC and British Airways. 
8. In an earlier paper (Dunsire et.al., 1988) reference was 
made to the possibility of inferring from the kind of 
information passed up and down the organisation the type of 
management which exists. Did the information primarily consist 
of ttcontrO1stl or ltnewst@? Was the information primarily input 
or output orientated? Unfortunately, it has proved too 
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difficult to obtain the kind of internal data (access to 
memoranda etc.) to proceed far with this line of enquiry. 
However, it is potentially a fertile area for research where 
data permit. 
9. Drucker's comment was directed at non-profit organisations 
like charities and non-profit schools and hospitals. However, 
it appears applicable to all organisational forms where the 
profit goal is attenuated. 
10. Although the research did not address the effect of 
changes of status within the private sector, the method 
outlined in this paper can be adapted to assessing the effects 
of MBOs, divestments, takeovers, ttgoing publiP and ttgoing 
private", etc.. 
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Table 1 Organisational Status Changes 
Organisation 
Post Office postal Government department 
to public corporation 
Post Office Government department 
telecommunications to public corporation 
London Transport Public corporation 
to (local) gqvernment 
department 
London Transport 
British Aerospace 
British Aerospace 
National Freight 
HMSO 
Royal Mint 
Rolls Royce 
Royal Ordnance 
Factories 
British Airways 
Type of change 
(local) government 
department to 
public corporation 
Public limited 
companies to public 
corporation 
Public corporation 
to public limited 
company 
Public corporation 
to limited company3 
Government department 
to trading fund 
Government department 
to trading fund 
Public limited 
company4to state owned 
company 
Government department 
to trading fund 
Public corporation - 
anticipation effect 
Date 
April 
1969 
April 
1969 
Jan 
1970 
June 
1984 
April 
1977 
Feb 
19812 
1981 
April 
1975 
April 
Feb 
Feb 
1971 
July 
1974 
19805 
Predicted Change 
in efficiency 
Improvement 
Improvement 
Deterioration 
Improvement 
Deterioration 
Improvement 
Improvement 
Improvement 
Improvement 
Deterioration 
Improvement 
Improvement 
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Table 2: PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
Organisation Employment 
Function 
Labour 
Productivity 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
Financial 
Ratios 
Royal Mint Confirmed 
London Transport 
(1970 change) Not confirmed 
London Transport 
(1984 change) Mainly confirmed 
British Airways Confirmed 
British Aerwe 
(a8tioD8lis8tiaa) Mainly coof irmed 
British Aerospace 
(privatisation) Confirmed 
National Freight Confirmed 
Post Office Postal Not confirmed 
Post Office 
Telecommunications hlaioly confirmed 
HMSO Confirmed 
Royal Ordnance Factories Not confirmed 
Rolls Royce Sot confirmed 
Confirmed 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Unclear 
Not confirmed 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Unclear 
Unclear 
Confirmed 
Unclear 
Unclear 
Not confirmed 
Unclear 
Not confirmed 
N/A 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Unclear 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Not confirmed 
Figure 1 
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